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Abstract   Securing the organization critical information assets from sophisticated insider threats and outsider at-
tacks is essential to ensure business continuity and efficiency. The information security risk management (ISRM) 
is the process that identifies the threats and vulnerabilities of an enterprise information system, evaluates the li-
kelihood of their occurrence and estimates their potential business impact. It is a continuous process that allows 
cost effectiveness of implemented security controls and provides a dynamic set of tools to monitor the security 
level of the information system. However, the examination of existing practices of the enterprises reveals a poor 
effectiveness of information security management processes such as stated in the information security breaches 
surveys. In particular, the enterprises experience difficulties in assessing and managing their security risks, in 
implementing appropriate security controls, as well as in preventing security threats. The available ISRM models 
and frameworks mainly focus on the technical modules related to the development of security mitigation and 
prevention and do not pay much attention to the influence of business variables affecting the reliability of the 
provided solutions. This paper discusses the major business related factors for risk analysis and shows their inter-
ference in the ISRM process. These factors include the enterprise strategic environment, the organizational struc-
ture features, the customer relationship and the value chain configuration.  
Introduction 
Information is a valuable asset supporting management decisions and business operations within the enterprise. 
Consequently, securing the company critical information assets from sophisticated insider threats and outsider 
attacks is essential to ensure business continuity and compliance with regulatory frameworks. However, the 
evaluation of existing practices of the enterprises reveals a poor effectiveness of information security manage-
ment processes such as stated in the information security breaches surveys. In particular, the 14th annual CSI re-
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port [1] indicates increasing incidences, compared to the last year, of financial fraud, malware infection, denials 
of service, password sniffing, and Web site defacement. In the case of the UK businesses, the BERR ISBS report 
[2] reveals that although there is a wide consensus that security is a high priority to their board, only 55% have a 
security policy, 48% formally assess risks, 56% have procedures to log and respond to security incidents, 11% 
have implemented the ISO 27001 standard that provides a framework for information security management. In 
France, the CLUSIF report shows that only 55% of the interviewed enterprises have proceeded to the formaliza-
tion of their security policy, 32% use ISO 17799 [3] to achieve this activity, only 30% carry out a total risks 
analysis related to their information system security and more than 75% of the companies do not measure their 
security level regularly. 
These results indicate that the security controls and procedures established by the enterprises cannot match 
the requirements of their real business operations. We claim that reasons for this can be summarized as: (a) the 
enterprises experience difficulties in assessing and managing their security risks, in implementing appropriate 
security controls, as well as in preventing security threats; (b) the need to customize available ISRM frameworks 
to the business and the organizational context of the enterprise. In fact, some authors [4] have identified as a crit-
ical issue for the security managers the need to face both a set of predictable threats and a set of emerging and 
context related intractable problems. In the first case, a number of methods and techniques are available with the 
objective of reducing risks through the selection of appropriate countermeasures at a technical and procedural 
level. For the second class of problems, they introduce concepts such as formative context, improvisation and 
hacking to provide additional capabilities to the management. In the remaining part of this paper we will refer to 
the first category of threats, which require well structured and formalized techniques based on monitoring and 
control. Furthermore, recent works have emphasized the need for a holistic view on information security which 
takes into account both context related and behavioral aspects of organizational phenomena [5]. In fact each or-
ganization is subject to external regulations having an impact on security issues, such as for instance laws, regu-
lations and agreements with other partners. Within this context, the ISRM is the process that identifies controls 
and minimizes security risks affecting information and business processes for an acceptable cost. It is the basis 
of effective governance and protection of the organization information assets [6]. It can be preceded by a risk 
analysis activity [7] that identifies the threats and vulnerabilities, evaluates the likelihood of their occurrence and 
estimates their potential business impact. There are many methodologies aimed at allowing risk analysis in order 
to help organizations assess their security risks and implement appropriate security controls. Despite the interest 
of these assessment methods, we have noticed that the organizational and managerial issues are insufficiently 
addressed and developed. These methods fail to estimate specific organizational and managerial parameters re-
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lated to the security risk management. In fact, these methods remain mainly focused on the technical issues and 
factors related to the development of security protection. Many authors [8, 4, 5] argued that it is difficult to select 
an appropriate risk analysis method that will best suit the specific organization requirements. Several researches 
have highlighted the significant importance of management related risk analysis factors in the ISRM process, 
such as the changes of the internal and external environment of the organization [9], the business processes and 
internal controls [10], the business maturity that refers to the organization’s position in the business lifecycle 
[11], the importance of various business functions and the necessity level of various assets [12], the cultural, and 
legislative issues [13]. Each organization is different in strategy, structure, resources and capabilities; therefore 
each will have specific information security requirements and risk management processes. Additional effort is 
needed to customize available ISRM frameworks to current or future business activities, organization and mana-
gerial procedures so as to ensure the cost effectiveness of implemented security controls. Thus, the objectives of 
this paper are firstly, to identify specific business related risk analysis factors; and secondly, to provide an 
enrichment of existing ISRM methods to address strategic, organizational and managerial issues. Our contribu-
tions in this paper are three-fold. First, we propose additional risk analysis factors according to a business view. 
Second, we discuss their interference with the technical processes of the ISRM. Finally, we provide an example 
of applicability of these factors within the NetRAM
©
 framework which will be further introduced. The remaind-
er of the paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the most renowned risk management approaches 
and comments some shortcuts related to these methodologies. The second section shows how business and orga-
nizational parameters should be addressed. Section 3 presents an enhancement of NetRAM framework. Finally, 
the conclusion discusses perspectives for future researches. 
Related works  
The review of the common risk management frameworks reveals four mainly steps. They are (a) the classifica-
tion of information assets according to their sensitivity, (b) the identification of the threats and vulnerabilities, (c) 
the likelihood occurrences and impact estimation of these threats and (d) the implementation of controls and cor-
rective countermeasures taking into consideration their cost. 
The research work of [14] and [15] provides an interesting report and evaluation of the most important stan-
dards (e.g. ISO 27001), guidelines (e.g. Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems [16]), and 
models (e.g. OCTAVE [17]) assessing and managing risks in the information security field. The authors high-
4  
light mainly four weaknesses associated to the considered risk analysis approaches which are (a) the lack of cost 
estimation techniques related to risk management activities (b) the absence of techniques for scenario attacks re-
construction (c) the absence of relevant criteria to select appropriate control measures according to the enterprise 
specificities and (d) the lack of links between the business activity of the enterprise and the monitoring and secu-
rity incident response during the risk management process. Consequently, the aforementioned authors have pro-
posed a framework, called Network Risk Analysis Method (NetRAM
©
) based on ten modules, as illustrated by 
Figure 1. In this framework, the risk management is viewed as an iterative and learning process that allows ade-
quate levels of reactivity and prevention through the possibility of the re-execution of risk management activities 
after the occurrence of new vulnerabilities or attacks threatening the enterprise information security. The Ne-
tRAM framework begins with an estimation of the cost and the planning of the different risk management activi-
ties. The objective of the asset analysis step is to collect data about information system components and to estab-
lish certain dependency links between them that might be useful for attack scenarios modeling. The processes of 
vulnerabilities and threats identification aim at classifying the weaknesses, the security breaches and the attacks 
that threaten valuable information assets. In the risk analysis process, the risks harming information assets are 
defined and ranked with regard to security needs. Then, based on the level of protection required for the ana-
lyzed information assets and the available budget, a set of security countermeasures is proposed, selected and 
implemented in the setting of a security policy. In the monitoring step, a set of relevant security metrics should 
be continuously measured and controlled to check periodically the information system operation and to maintain 
an acceptable security level. In the last process, decisions about security incident response are taken to select the 
most cost-effective reactions and to ensure the information system continuity.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The NetRAM framework for risk management [14] 
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In spite of the interest of NetRAM framework, only technical concerns are addressed. While NetRAM takes 
care of cost-benefit analysis and the management of security project development [18], it does not consider the 
enterprise business activities and the organizational procedures in the evaluation of risk analysis.  
Business related factors for risk analysis 
 
The ISRM process must reflect the organization’s business activity and takes into account all aspects of how in-
formation is processed, stored and disposed. Due to the reality of nearly unlimited threats and the limited availa-
ble security budget,  critical decisions must be made concerning the implementation of protection and mitigation 
procedures to reduce the likelihood or impact associated with the security risks or the acceptance of risk that al-
low the business process to operate with a known risk under control. Cost-benefit analysis of risk mitigation and 
acceptance must be achieved to balance potential losses of integrity, confidentiality or availability of information 
resources against the expenditures on security countermeasures and controls. Furthermore, given the changing 
nature of technological and economic environment as well as the evolving risks, a dynamic and proactive risk 
management process capable of adapting company operational procedures, resource management, and corporate 
strategy to the evolution of security risks, is necessary. To this end, we propose four business related risk factors 
and show how they interfere in the NetRAM
©
 framework. These factors involve the strategy, the organization, 
the customer relationship and the value chain configuration.  
At the strategic level, we suggest to consider two parameters linked to the business environment of the enter-
prise. They are (a) the competition intensity and (b) the compliance with legal and governance frameworks. The 
former parameter indicates the competition pressure in the activity sector of the enterprise and highlights the 
need to protect the information system from economic intelligence. This parameter increases the vigilance of the 
enterprise that must be doubly careful and, affects the number of control points, the sophistication of security so-
lutions and the regularity of monitoring activities. It also shows how damaging the threats targeting the enter-
prise activity can be. The legal and governance frameworks have increased the accountability and the liability of 
the corporate executives. If the enterprise adopts governance policies and procedures dealing with compliance 
with legal framework, the ISRM focuses on ensuring that the IT risks related to the business impact analysis are 
controlled and mitigated.  
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At the organizational level, the ISRM should integrate at least two parameters: (a) the level of procedure 
formalization and (b) the control system performance. The formalization of work processes through rules, proce-
dures, and policy manuals improves the traceability of information processing and storage. It consequently facili-
tates the detection of incoherent management operations, manipulation errors or abuse. When the formalization 
level is low, the ambiguity within the organization increases the effort required to conduct risk analysis. Moreo-
ver, the existence of a well-organized control system reduces the errors related to either the decisions or the ac-
tions over a given period of time. Thus, also in this case the risk analysis process can be conducted more effi-
ciently.  
At the customer relationship level, the ISRM should integrate at least two parameters: a) the customer varie-
ty and b) the channel variety. The customer variety refers to the level of segmentation of customers that can lead 
to different kind of threats. The channel variety refers to the number of different channels available for providing 
the products/services.  
Finally, there are two parameters associated with the value chain configuration. We refer to them as (a) the IT 
integration, and (b) the inter cyber process relations. The former parameter expresses the dependency level of the 
value chain on the use of IT for the operation of its activities. If this level is important, special focus must be 
placed on security solutions design in order to allow for more efficient value chain integrity. The second parame-
ter describes the interfaces between the value chain processes. Control and visibility of the data flowing between 
processes should be protected against any harmful threat. The compliance of the rules governing the execution or 
management of these processes should be maintained any time a modification, an addition or a drop of rules is 
realized.   
Towards a business-aware information security risk analysis 
 
We find it convenient to include the aforementioned business related risk analysis factors to the different mod-
ules NetRAM framework
3
. Indeed, some among these modules cannot achieve their real objectives without con-
sidering the business related factors. 
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The strategic environment affects considerably the security policy objectives that are an essential prerequisite 
for the initialization and asset analysis modules. According to the security policy, the organization classifies its 
information assets in accordance to their business value and sensitivity in order to ensure that effective protec-
tion takes place. The sensitivity is related to several environmental variables such as the security level required 
by the trading partners, the importance of the assets in the value chain operation, legal rules, and competitive 
pressure. These constraints increase the required level of confidentiality and integrity of business information, 
affecting the company reputation that is valued as an important asset. In the vulnerabilities identification module, 
special focus must be placed on organizational parameters. It is important at this stage to get well acquainted 
with operational procedures and the work methods employed to handle business information in order to identify 
the procedures, the practices and the personnel that could lead to a possible threat or vulnerability. During threats 
identification, the parameters related to the strategic environment of the enterprise have to be considered. In par-
ticular, the arrival of new competitors and the changes of the regulatory context can increase the probability of 
threats occurrence. Furthermore,  in both the vulnerabilities and threats identification modules customer relation-
ships parameters should be taken into account. For instance in case of a service provider, the number and the 
kind of threats and vulnerabilities vary with the number of customer interfaces (i.e. mobile, internet, call center, 
etc.). In the countermeasure management module, the selection of security controls is dependent upon organiza-
tional procedures, and should also be subject to all relevant legislations. The decision makers should set up the 
criteria for determining whether risks can be accepted according to the operational requirements and constraints 
of the business process activities. In this setting, the value chain configuration parameters should support such 
decisions to balance the investment between implementation and operation of the control thwarting the harm 
likely to result from security failures. In addition, the processes countermeasures should be integrated in the 
working practices, applied consistently across all operations, and should properly reflect the security policy 
guidelines. In the monitoring module, the internal and external levels of assets protection are evaluated. Through 
the surveillance of a set of important metrics and agent profiles, the monitoring module should be able to manage 
the state of the information system and should be capable of detecting operation anomalies and misuses. It is ob-
vious that the definition of metrics, the estimation of the alarms levels, and the users’ profiles are tightly related 
to the business factors, we have discussed. Finally, the decisions that would be made during the incident re-
sponse module can have a direct impact on the formalization of certain organizational procedures and imposes 
new controls. It may generate new managerial controls or modify existing operational procedures. In particular, 
the cost, time and amount of modification should be evaluated for any decision to be selected.  It seems conse-
quently that NetRAM involves at the same level, security experts and decisions makers. Indeed, close collabora-
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tion between business unit operators and technical staff (e.g. security incident team) is necessary with the pur-
pose of responding to business needs in terms of sharing information, defining sensitivity levels and discussing 
effectiveness of protection procedures.  
Conclusion 
The research aim of this paper was to determine a set of business related information security risk analysis fac-
tors. More specifically, one objective was to identify strategic and organizational parameters and determine the 
extent to which these parameters affect the ISRM process. Another objective was to provide a generic ISRM 
model to the managers in order to assist critical decisions in information security activities and to meet the 
changing business needs of their organizations. It is necessary to recognize that some risk analysis factors may 
not be applicable to every information system or environment, and might not be relevant for all organizations. 
Future research aiming to collect data related to the risk analysis for various types of organizations and business 
activities would help in gaining better adjustment of the proposed ISRM model. 
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